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The core of security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) is the estimation of a parame-
ter that determines the amount of privacy amplification that the users need to apply in order to
distill a secret key. To estimate this parameter using the observed data, one needs to apply con-
centration inequalities, such as random sampling theory or Azuma’s inequality. The latter can be
straightforwardly employed in a wider class of QKD protocols, including those that do not rely
on basis independent sources, such as the loss-tolerant (LT) protocol. However, when applied to
real-life finite-length QKD experiments, Azuma’s inequality typically results in substantially lower
secret-key rates. Here, we propose an alternative security analysis of the LT protocol against gen-
eral attacks, for both its prepare-and-measure and measurement-device-independent versions, that
is based on random sampling theory. Consequently, our security proof provides considerably higher
secret-key rates than the previous finite-key analysis based on Azuma’s inequality. This work opens
up the possibility of using random sampling theory to provide alternative security proofs for other
QKD protocols.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant
users, Alice and Bob, to generate a shared secret key in
the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, with unbounded
computational power [1, 2]. To prove the security of
QKD, we often consider the error rate that Alice and Bob
would have obtained in a fictitious scenario, known as
the phase-error rate, which directly bounds the amount
of sifted-key information that could have leaked to Eve,
and determines the amount of privacy amplification that
the users need to apply to distill a secret key [3–6]. Since
Alice and Bob cannot directly observe the phase-error
rate, they must estimate it using the data collected in the
test rounds, i.e. the detected rounds which are not used
to generate the sifted key. For this estimation, it is indis-
pensable to employ statistical techniques. For example,
in the case of the BB84 protocol [7] without source flaws,
one can use the fact that Alice’s source is basis indepen-
dent to estimate the Z-basis phase-error rate from the
X-basis bit-error rate, and vice-versa, using random sam-
pling theory [8, 9]. In protocols where the user sources are
basis dependent, the detection statistics of a particular
round may depend on the basis choices made in previous
rounds, and Azuma’s inequality [10] has been typically
applied to deal with this dependency [11–14]. However,
recently, Maeda et al. [15] have successfully applied a
non-trivial security analysis based on random sampling
theory to a twin-field QKD variant in which the users do
not employ a basis independent source. This work raises
the obvious question of whether random sampling theory
could also be applied to other protocols that do not use
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a basis independent source, and whose security proofs
currently rely on Azuma’s inequality. Since the estima-
tion of Eve’s side information is the core of QKD security
proofs, investigating the possibility of using different es-
timation techniques deepens our understanding of QKD
protocols and their security. Moreover, it has important
experimental implications, in terms of the secret-key rate
obtainable, since concentration bounds for independent
random variables, such as the Chernoff bound, are typi-
cally tighter than those for dependent random variables,
such as Azuma’s inequality.
One obvious candidate to investigate is the loss-
tolerant (LT) protocol [12], a three-state protocol that
is resistant to losses in the presence of state prepara-
tion flaws (SPFs), which arise from the finite precision
of modulation devices. Earlier attempts to address SPFs
[16] resulted in a performance that degraded very quickly
with moderate-to-high channel losses. Conversely, even
in the presence of large SPFs and high losses, the perfor-
mance of the LT protocol is close to that of a perfect four-
state BB84 protocol, at least in the limit of infinitely-long
keys [12]. Recent works [17–19] have shown that one
can prove the security of the LT protocol in the pres-
ence of additional source imperfections, such as mode
dependencies, Trojan horse attacks or pulse correlations,
as long as one can ensure that their magnitude is suf-
ficiently small. Also, the LT protocol can be combined
with measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [20]
to guarantee the security in the presence of arbitrarily
flawed detectors. Moreover, the LT protocol is highly
practical and can be implemented with off-the-shelf de-
vices. In fact, several experiments have implemented the
LT protocol [21, 22], and a variation of it [23] set a fi-
bre QKD distance record. For these reasons, a deep un-
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derstanding of its security is of theoretical and practical
interest.
Clearly, in the LT protocol, Alice’s source is not basis
independent. For starters, in its standard three-state for-
mulation, Alice only emits one of the two X-basis states.
However, even if one were to apply the LT idea to a four-
state protocol, the source would still be basis dependent,
due to the SPFs. Thus, Azuma’s inequality has been
used in both the asymptotic [12] and finite-key [13] secu-
rity proofs of the LT protocol. In the asymptotic regime,
the specific statistical technique employed does not affect
the performance, since the deviation terms vanish in the
limit of infinitely-long keys. However, choosing the tight-
est statistical technique available does have an impact on
the key rate obtainable in (existing and future) real-life
finite-length implementations of the LT protocol.
In this paper, we show how the finite-key security of the
LT protocol against general attacks can be reduced to a
random sampling problem, for both its original prepare-
and-measure (P&M) version and its MDI version. This
random sampling problem can be solved using concen-
tration inequalities for sums of independent random vari-
ables, which results in tighter bounds than those of a pre-
vious analysis [13] based on Azuma’s inequality. Our pa-
per is structured as follows. In Section I, we present our
general statistical analysis, inspired by that of Ref. [15],
and apply it to a generic scenario. In Section II, we show
how this analysis can be used to estimate the phase-error
rate of the P&M LT protocol, and in Section III, we do
the same for the MDI LT protocol. In Section IV, we
give an expression for the secret-key rate obtainable in
both protocols. In Section V, we simulate the secret-key
rate obtainable for different values of the block size, and
compare it with that of alternative analyses. Finally, in
Section VI, we conclude our paper.
I. GENERAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we present our general estimation pro-
cedure and apply it to a generic scenario, which we denote
as the Tagged Virtual Protocol (TVP). Its name refers
to the fact that, as we will see in Sections II and III, one
can draw an equivalence between the TVP and the vir-
tual protocols of both LT P&M QKD and LT MDI QKD,
once the users probabilistically assign tags to their emis-
sions.
In the TVP, the users emit, amongst others, the states
ρvir, ρpos and ρneg, with probabilities pvir, ppos and pneg.
These may be states sent by Alice, in the P&M protocol,
or joint states sent by Alice and Bob, in the MDI proto-
col. Also, ρvir is one of the virtual states, emitted only
in the virtual protocol, while ρpos and ρneg are actual
states, emitted also in the actual protocol. These states
satisfy
ρvir = cposρpos − cnegρneg (1)
where cpos and cneg are some non-negative coefficients
such that cpos − cneg = 1. For reasons that will become
clear later on, we assume that the users assign a tag of
t ∈ {vir, pos, neg} to each emission of ρt. That is, each
emission of ρvir is trivially assigned a tag t = vir, and
so on. In the quantum communication phase of the pro-
tocol, some of these emissions will be detected. Here, a
“detection” refers to any process that depends on Eve’s
attack and distinguishes some emissions from others. For
the P&M protocol, we will define a detection as an event
in which Bob obtained a particular measurement result,
and for the MDI protocol, as an event in which Char-
lie reports a projection to a particular Bell state. We
denote by Nt the number of detected emissions with a
tag of t, i.e., the number of detected emissions of ρt.
In the actual protocol, the outcome of the random vari-
ables Npos and Nneg can be directly observed by the
users, but the outcome of Nvir cannot, and must be es-
timated. Thus, the objective of the analysis is to find
a statistical relationship between Nvir, Npos and Nneg;
more specifically, we want to find a function f such that
Pr[Nvir > f(Npos, Nneg; ε)] ≤ ε, where ε can be made ar-
bitrarily small.
The starting point of the analysis is Eq. (1), which we
now rewrite as
ρpos = pρvir|posρvir + pρneg|posρneg, (2)
where pρvir|pos = 1/cpos and pρneg|pos = cneg/cpos. Equa-
tion (2) implies that sending ρpos is equivalent to sending
ρvir with probability pρvir|pos and ρneg with probability
pρneg|pos. That is, the TVP is indistinguishable from the
following scenario:
– The users select tag t ∈ {vir, pos, neg} with proba-
bility pt.
– If t = pos, the users emit ρvir with probability
pρvir|pos, or ρneg with probability pρneg|pos.
– If t ∈ {vir, neg}, the users emit ρt.
In the above scenario, some emissions of ρvir will have a
tag of “vir”, and some will have a tag of “pos”, but they
are otherwise identical. The same is true for emissions of
ρneg with tags of “neg” and “pos”. Thus, one can go even
further, and think of another equivalent scenario in which
the users first decide the quantum state that they emit,
and then probabilistically assign a tag to it. Namely:
Modified scenario
• The users select and emit the state ρx ∈
{ρvir, ρneg} with probability p̃ρx := px +
ppospρx|pos.
• Next, they assign their emission the tag t =
x with probability p̃x|ρx := px/p̃ρx , or the
tag t = pos with probability p̃pos|ρx := 1 −
p̃x|ρx .
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This modified scenario is equivalent to the TVP in
terms of tags, because:
1. The overall probability to assign a particular tag
t ∈ {vir, pos, neg} is the same in both scenarios,
i.e. pt.
2. The quantum state emitted given a particular tag
t is the same in both scenarios, i.e. ρt.
In the modified scenario, let Ñρxt be the number of de-











t be the total number of detected emis-
sions with a tag of t. That is, Ñvir = Ñ
ρvir
vir , Ñpos =
Ñρvirpos + Ñ
ρneg
pos , and Ñneg = Ñ
ρneg
neg . The equivalence above
implies that, for any attack by Eve, the set of random
variables {Nvir, Npos, Nneg} in the TVP has an identical
distribution as the set {Ñvir, Ñpos, Ñneg} in the modi-
fied scenario. Hence, if we find a function f such that
Pr
[
Ñvir > f(Ñpos, Ñneg; ε)
]
≤ ε in an execution of the
modified scenario, then it must also be the case that
Pr
[
Nvir > f(Npos, Nneg; ε)
]
≤ ε in an execution of the
TVP. The equivalence between the two scenarios is shown
in Fig. 1.
. . . . . . 
Figure 1. Relationship between the Tagged Virtual Proto-
col (TVP) and the modified scenario. In the modified sce-
nario, each emission of ρvir (ρneg) is assigned a tag of either
“vir” (“neg”) or “pos” with a fixed probability, in such a way
that emissions with a tag of t ∈ {vir, neg, pos} are equiva-
lent to emissions of ρt in the TVP. In the modified scenario,
the detection statistics of each emission must be independent
of the tag assigned to it, since Eve does not have any tag
information. Hence, each of the Ñρvir (Ñρneg ) detected emis-
sions of ρvir (ρneg) is assigned a tag of either “vir” (“neg”) or
“pos” with the a priori fixed probability. This allows us to
find a statistical relationship between the random variables
Ñvir := Ñ
ρvir




pos and Ñneg := Ñ
ρneg
neg us-
ing a random sampling analysis, see Eq. (5). Since the TVP
is equivalent to the modified scenario, the same relationship
must hold for the random variables Nvir, Npos and Nneg in
the TVP, see Eq. (6).
The random tag assignments in the modified scenario
allow us to find a bound on Ñvir by using a random sam-
pling analysis. The key idea is that the probability to
assign a particular tag to a particular emission must be
independent of whether the emission is detected or not,
since the tag assignment does not change the emitted
quantum state, and Eve does not have any tag informa-
tion. Thus, each of the Ñρvir detected emissions of ρvir is
assigned a random tag of “vir” or “pos” with probabili-
ties p̃vir|ρvir and p̃pos|ρvir = 1− p̃vir|ρvir , respectively. This
implies that Ñρvirvir is a random sample of a population of
Ñρvir = Ñρvirvir + Ñ
ρvir
pos elements, where each item is sam-
pled with probability p̃vir|ρvir . In Appendix A, we show
that this implies that, except with probability ε/2,
Ñρvirvir ≤ gU
(
Ñρvirpos , p̃vir|ρvir , ε/2
)
, (3)
where gU is defined in Eq. (A3). Similarly Ñ
ρneg
pos is the





neg elements, where each item is sampled with




Ñneg, p̃pos|ρneg , ε/2
)
, (4)
where gL is defined in Eq. (A3).
Using the relations Ñvir = Ñ
ρvir





and Ñneg = Ñ
ρneg










Ñneg, p̃pos|ρneg , ε/2
)




except with probability ε, where in the first inequality
we have used Eq. (3), and in the second inequality we
have used Eq. (4) and the fact that gU is an increasing
function with respect to its first argument.
As explained above, the random variables
{Nvir, Npos, Nneg} in the TVP are identically dis-
tributed as the random variables {Ñvir, Ñpos, Ñneg} in






Nneg, p̃pos|ρneg , ε/2
)
, p̃vir|ρvir , ε/2
)
:= f(Npos, Nneg; ε),
(6)
except with probability ε, as required. Since Npos and
Nneg are observables of the actual protocol, Alice and
Bob can use their observed values to obtain an upper
bound on Nvir.
In Sections II and III, we explain how to apply this
statistical analysis to the LT protocol, for both its P&M
and MDI versions. In this protocol, the virtual states
and the actual states are all in the same qubit space. Be-
cause of this, each virtual state can be expressed as an
operator-form linear function of the actual states. How-
ever, this linear function does not necessarily have one
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positive term and one negative term, as in Eq. (1). To
apply the analysis above, the users will first probabilis-
tically assign tags of “pos” and “neg” to some of their
emissions, in such a way that the average state with a
tag of t ∈ {pos, neg} is ρt. After these tag assignments,
the resulting tagged virtual protocol will be equivalent to
the TVP, shown on the left side of Fig. 1.
II. PREPARE-AND-MEASURE PROTOCOL
In this section, we apply our analysis to the P&M LT
protocol [12]. For each round, Alice sends Bob a pure
state |ψj〉a with probability pj , j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, where
emissions of |ψ0X 〉a (|ψ0Z 〉a and |ψ1Z 〉a) are considered to
belong to the X (Z) basis. The only assumption needed
to apply our analysis is that Alice’s states are charac-
terised and linearly dependent, i.e. they are all in the
same qubit space. For simplicity, in this discussion we
assume that the states are in the XZ plane of the Bloch
sphere; in Appendix B, we show how to apply our results
in the general case. Bob measures the incoming signals
in the Z or in the X basis, with probabilities pZB and
pXB , respectively. We do not need to assume that Bob’s
measurement bases are mutually unbiased, but we do as-
sume that his choice of basis is fully random, and that
the detection efficiency is the same for both bases. After-
wards, Bob reveals which rounds were detected, and both
users reveal their basis choice in those rounds. The sifted
key is generated from the detected events in which Alice
and Bob both chose the Z basis. The detected rounds in
which Bob chose the X basis are considered to be test
rounds. In these, Bob will reveal his measurement result.
The full protocol description is given in Appendix C.
The objective of the security analysis is to estimate
the number of phase errors in the sifted key, using the
test data. To define this quantity, we consider an equiva-
lent entanglement-based virtual protocol, in which Alice






|0Z〉A |ψ0Z 〉a + |1Z〉A |ψ1Z 〉a
)
, (7)
where a is the photonic system sent to Bob and A is
Alice’s fictitious qubit ancilla, which she keeps in her
lab. For simplicity, in Eq. (7), we have assumed that
p0Z = p1Z . The key generated in the actual protocol is
equivalent to the key that Alice and Bob would obtain by
performing a Z-basis measurement on the systems A and
a of the detected rounds in which Alice generated |ΨZ〉Aa.
The number of phase errors is defined as the number of
errors that Alice and Bob would have observed if they
had measured these systems A and a in the X basis in-
stead. This is equivalent to a scenario in which, in the
key rounds, Alice sends Bob the virtual states
|ψvirα〉a =
|ψ0Z 〉a + (−1)α |ψ1z〉a
√






pZA(1 − (−1)α 〈ψ0Z |ψ1Z 〉a), (9)
and Bob measures these states in the X basis. Here,
pZA is the probability that Alice selects the Z basis, and
α ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, Alice’s choice of state in the virtual
protocol can be equivalently described by assuming that
she fictitiously prepares the entangled state
|Ψvir〉Sa =
√





p0ZpXB |2〉S |ψ0Z 〉a +
√
p1ZpXB |3〉S |ψ1Z 〉a
+
√
p0XpXB |4〉S |ψ0X 〉a +
√
p0XpZB |5〉S |ψ0X 〉a ,
(10)
and then performs a measurement on system S. Note
that S holds information about Alice’s and Bob’s setting
choices. For instance, |2〉S represents the events in which
Alice selects the virtual state |ψ0Z 〉a and Bob chooses the
X basis. In the right-hand side of Eq. (10), the first two
terms are associated with virtual events. That is, the
events in which Alice and Bob select the Z basis in the
actual protocol, but their basis choice is replaced by the
X basis in the virtual protocol. All the other terms in
Eq. (10) correspond to actual events that occur in the
actual protocol.
In the virtual protocol that we have just defined, the
occurrence of a phase error is defined as an event in which
Alice measures system S, obtains the outcome 0 (1), and
Bob’s X-basis measurement outputs the bit value 1 (0).
The measurement statistics associated with these events
cannot be directly observed, since the virtual states are
never sent in the actual protocol. However, as we show
in Appendix B, one can exploit the fact that the virtual
states and the actual states live in the same qubit space
to find an operator-form linear relationship between the
virtual states and the actual states. Namely,
ρvir0 = c0Z |vir0ρ0Z + c1Z |vir0ρ1Z + c0X |vir0ρ0X ,
ρvir1 = c0Z |vir1ρ0Z + c1Z |vir1ρ1Z + c0X |vir1ρ0X , (11)
where ρvirα ≡ |ψvirα〉〈ψvirα |a, ρj ≡ |ψj〉〈ψj |a, and the
coefficients cj|virα can be positive, negative or zero de-
pending on the form of the actual states {|ψj〉a}. For
example, when there are no SPFs, the emitted states are
|ψ0Z 〉a = |0Z〉a, |ψ1Z 〉a = |1Z〉a and |ψ0X 〉a = |0X〉a; and
Eq. (11) becomes ρvir0 = ρ0X and ρvir1 = ρ0Z +ρ1Z −ρ0X .
Next, in order to employ the analysis in Section I, we
rewrite Eq. (11) as
ρvir0 = cpos0ρpos0 − cneg0ρneg0 , (12)
ρvir1 = cpos1ρpos1 − cneg1ρneg1 , (13)








pj|tα |ψj〉〈ψj |a . (15)
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In Eq. (15), Sposα (Snegα) is the set of indices j such that





Now, each of Eqs. (12) and (13) is identical to Eq. (1), the
starting point of the statistical fluctuation analysis intro-
duced in Section I. We will apply this analysis to estimate
the detection statistics of each virtual state, separately.
Recall that, in the TVP defined in Section I, the states
sent are ρvir, ρpos and ρneg (see Fig. 1). However, in
the virtual protocol defined above, Alice does not emit
the states ρpos0 , ρpos1 , ρneg0 and ρneg1 . Instead, Alice
will probabilistically assign tags of t0 ∈ {pos0, neg0} and
t1 ∈ {pos1, neg1} to some of her emissions, in such a way
that the average state with a tag of t0 (t1) is ρt0 (ρt1).
After doing so, we can draw an equivalence between the
virtual protocol and the TVP.
More concretely, let us consider the events in which
Alice emits |ψj〉a, j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, and Bob chooses the
X basis, corresponding to measuring system S of Eq. (10)
in 2, 3 or 4. Each of these events occurs with probability






or a tag of tα = junkα otherwise; where α ∈ {0, 1},
pj|tα is given by Eq. (16), and ptα is the total probability
of assigning tag tα. Note that the assignment of tag
t0 and of tag t1 is done independently: each of these
emissions will have both a tag of t0 and a tag of t1. This is
allowed because our key idea relies only on a probabilistic
assignment of a tag, and even if multiple assignments
are made for a single pulse, the argument still holds. In
Eq. (17), the conditional probabilities ptα|j,XB become
fixed once one chooses the value of ptα , which must be
such that ptα ≤ pjpXB/pj|tα for all j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X},
since ptα|j,XB ≤ 1. In order to waste as few test rounds as
possible, and thus obtain a tight estimate of the number
of phase errors, we assume that Alice chooses the largest






Moreover, in the virtual protocol, Alice assigns a deter-
ministic tag of t0 = vir0 (t1 = vir1) to each emission of
|ψvir0〉a (|ψvir1〉a), corresponding to S = 0 (S = 1).
After these tag assignments, an emission with a tag
of tα is equivalent to an emission of ρtα . Thus, if Alice
disregards the outcome of her measurement of system S,
and considers only the tags of tα that she assigns, the vir-
tual protocol becomes equivalent to a scenario in which
Alice actually emits ρtα with probability ptα , and then
trivially assigns her emission a tag of tα. This scenario,
which we denote as the the Tagged Virtual Protocol α
and depict on the right side of Fig. 2, is identical to the
TVP defined in Section I and shown on the left side of
Fig. 1.
S = 1
. . . . . . 
Figure 2. Relation between the virtual protocol and the
Tagged Virtual Protocol α, where α ∈ {0, 1}, for the
P&M scheme. In the virtual protocol, events for which
S ∈ {2, 3, 4} are probabilistically assigned a tag of tα ∈
{posα, negα, junkα} (dashed arrows), in such a way that the
average state with a tag of tα is ρtα . Events for which S = α
are deterministically assigned a tag of tα = virα (solid arrow).
If one considers only the tags of tα that Alice has assigned,
the virtual protocol becomes equivalent to the Tagged Virtual
Protocol α. The ellipses at the top of the diagram represent
events which are identical in both scenarios, but which are
not relevant for the analysis.
Let N1Xt0 (N
0X
t1 ) be the number of detected events with
a tag of t0 (t1) in which Bob obtained measurement result
1X (0X). Equation (6) of Section I implies that, in the













and in the Tagged Virtual Protocol 1, it holds that, ex-












where, for α ∈ {0, 1}, p̃virα|ρvirα = pvirα/(pvirα +
pposα/cposα) and p̃posα|ρnegα = 1 − pnegα/(pnegα +
pposαcnegα/cposα). Moreover, since the virtual protocol
is equivalent to the Tagged Virtual Protocol 0 (1), in
terms of the assigned tags of t0 (t1), Eq. (19) (Eq. (20))
must also hold for the virtual protocol. Thus, combining
Eqs. (19) and (20), we have that, in the virtual protocol,
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except with probability ε.
In order to use Eq. (21) to prove the security, the
quantities N1Xt0 and N
0X
t1 , for α ∈ {0, 1} and tα ∈
{posα, negα}, must be observables in an actual imple-
mentation of the protocol. Thus, the probabilistic tag
assignments defined in Eq. (17) must happen in the ac-
tual protocol too. However, note the following: (1) the
tag assigned to a particular emission must be indepen-
dent of Bob’s measurement result, since the tag assign-
ment does not change the emitted quantum state; and
(2) the assignment of tag tα is only relevant for the anal-
ysis if Bob happens to obtain a measurement outcome of
(α⊕1)X in that round. This implies that it is only neces-
sary for Alice to probabilistically assign a tag of t0 (t1) to
the events in which she sent |ψj〉a, j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, and
Bob obtained measurement result 1X (0X). For a full




In this section, we apply our analysis to the LT MDI
QKD protocol. For each round, Alice (Bob) selects the
state |ψj〉a (|ψ′s〉b) with probability pj (p′s), where j (s)
∈ {0, 1, τ}, and sends it to an untrusted middle node
Charlie. As in the P&M case, the only assumption re-
quired to apply our analysis is that all states emitted
by Alice (Bob) are in the same qubit space. For sim-
plicity, in this discussion we assume that all states lie in
the XZ plane of the Bloch sphere; in Appendix D, we
show how to treat the case in which they do not. Emis-
sions for which j ∈ {0, 1} (s ∈ {0, 1}) are considered to
belong to the Z basis, and for simplicity their selection





Z/2). We denote Alice and Bob’s joint state
by |ψj,s〉ab ≡ |ψj〉a⊗|ψ′s〉b, and its associated probability
by pj,s ≡ pjp′s.
Alice and Bob expect Charlie to perform a Bell state
measurement on each incoming joint pulse, and announce
the result. In most MDI protocols, including the original
MDI QKD proposal [20], Charlie may obtain a projec-
tion to one of two Bell states. However, for simplicity,
for now we assume that Charlie attempts to obtain a
projection to only one of the four Bell states, and that
if he is successful (unsuccessful), he reports the round as
“detected” (“undetected”). At the end of the section, we
show how to generalise the analysis to the case in which
Charlie may report a projection to two or more different
Bell states. Also, note that Charlie is untrusted, and may
even be fully controlled by Eve. Thus, in what follows,
we directly assume that it is Eve who performs the mea-
surements and announces the results. Importantly, Eve
is not limited to measuring each round independently: if
she performs a coherent attack, her full set of announce-
ments may depend on an arbitrary general measurement
acting jointly on the photonic systems of all the rounds
in the protocol.
After Eve’s announcements, Alice and Bob reveal,
for each round, whether or not they used the Z ba-
sis, thus learning whether or not (j, s) ∈ Z :=
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. The rounds for which (j, s) /∈
Z are automatically considered to belong to the set of test
emissions, which we denote as T . The rounds for which
(j, s) ∈ Z receive a special treatment: with probability
pK|Z they are considered key emissions, and with prob-
ability pT |Z they are considered test emissions, where K
is the set of key emissions, and pK|Z + pT |Z = 1. This is
needed because we want to use data from some Z-rounds
to estimate the phase-error rate. The resulting scenario
is shown on the left-hand side of Fig. 3. For all rounds
in T , Alice and Bob reveal their choice of (j, s).
Alice (Bob) defines her (his) sifted key as her (his)
choices of j (s) in the detected rounds in K. The objec-
tive of the analysis is to use the detection statistics of
the T -rounds to estimate the number of phase errors in
their sifted keys. This quantity is defined as the num-
ber of errors that Alice and Bob would have obtained if
they had run a virtual scenario in which they replaced
the K-emissions by the generation of the virtual state
|ΨK〉 = 12
∑
j,s=0,1 |jZ , sZ〉AB |ψj,s〉ab, followed by an X-
basis measurement on their local ancillas A and B. Let
ΠphAB be the projector onto the phase-error subspace in
AB. Note that the definition of a phase error depends on
the particular Bell state onto which Charlie is supposed
to project the incoming pulses. The average state of a






|ψj,s〉〈ψj,s|ab = pph|Kρph + pph|Kρph. (22)
where ρph and ρph are quantum states such that
pph|Kρph = TrAB [Π
ph
AB |ΨK〉〈ΨK|] and pph|Kρph =
TrAB [(I − ΠphAB) |ΨK〉〈ΨK|]. Thus, the virtual protocol
may be regarded as the following scenario: the users
jointly select K or T with probabilities pK = pZpK|Z
and pT = 1 − pK, respectively, and
• If they select K, they emit ρph and ρph with prob-
abilities pph|K and pph|K, respectively.
• If they select T , they emit |ψj,s〉ab with probabil-
ity pj,s|T = pj,spT |j,s/pT , where pT |j,s = pT |Z if
(j, s) ∈ Z and pT |j,s = 1 if (j, s) /∈ Z.
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Figure 3. Relationship between the actual protocol and the
Tagged Virtual Protocol in the MDI scenario. In the actual
protocol, shown on the left, emissions such that (j, s) ∈ Z are
probabilistically assigned to either K or T , while emissions
such that (j, s) /∈ Z are always assigned to T . In both the
actual and virtual protocols, events in T are probabilistically
assigned a tag of t ∈ {pos, neg, junk}, in such a way that
the average state with a tag of t is ρt. The dashed arrows
represent this tagging process. In the virtual protocol, K-
emissions are substituted by emissions of ρph and ρph, and
are assigned tags of “ph” and “ph”, respectively. If Alice and
Bob consider only the tags that they have assigned, the virtual
protocol becomes equivalent to the tagged virtual protocol,
shown on the right.
The number of phase errors, Nph, is defined as the
number of detected emissions of ρph that Alice and Bob
would have observed if they had run this virtual proto-
col. To estimate this quantity, we use again the random
sampling analysis of Section I. To apply this analysis,
however, we need to first show that ρph can be written
in the form of Eq. (1), i.e.,
ρph = cposρpos − cnegρneg, (23)
and then add a tagging step to the protocol, so that
it becomes equivalent to a scenario in which the states
ρpos and ρneg are actually emitted. In Appendix B, we
show that ρph can be expressed as an operator-form lin-





where ρj,s ≡ |ψj,s〉〈ψj,s|ab and the coefficients cj,s are real
and can be negative. Thus, if we denote by Spos (Sneg)
the set of pairs (j, s) such that cj,s is positive (negative),












|cj,s|/ct if (j, s) ∈ St,
0 otherwise,
(27)
we obtain Eq. (23).
In the tagging step, Alice and Bob need to probabilis-
tically assign tags of “pos” and “neg” to their emissions
in T , in such a way that the average state with a tag of
t is ρt. To achieve this, in the actual protocol, Alice and
Bob must assign a tag of t ∈ {pos, neg} to each emission





where pj,s|t is given by Eq. (27), and pt|T is the probabil-
ity that a round in T is assigned a tag of t. Note that the
assignment probabilities pt|j,s,T become fixed once one
chooses pt|T . From Eq. (28), it follows that the value of
pt|T must be such that pt|T ≤ pj,s|T /pj,s|t, ∀(j, s) ∈ St.






and we assume that Alice and Bob choose this value,
in order to waste as few T -rounds as possible and thus
obtain a tight estimate of the phase-error rate. Finally,
Alice and Bob assign the tag “junk” to all the remaining
rounds in T that have not been tagged as “pos” or “neg”.
Since T -emissions are identical in the actual and vir-
tual protocols, the previous tag assignments can be re-
garded as taking place in both protocols. Besides, let
us further assume that, in the virtual protocol, Alice
and Bob assign trivial tags of “ph” and “ph” to each
emission of ρph and ρph, respectively. Then, if Alice and
Bob disregard their choice of state, and consider only the
tags that they have assigned, the resulting tagged virtual
protocol becomes equivalent to the scenario depicted in
the right-hand side of Fig. 3, in which Alice and Bob
emit ρt, t ∈ {ph, ph, pos, neg, junk}, with probability pt;
where pt = pKpt|K for t ∈ {ph, ph}, and pt = pT pt|T
for t ∈ {pos, neg, junk}. This scenario is identical to the
starting point of the random sampling analysis in Sec-
tion I, the TVP shown on the left side of Fig. 1. The
only differences are that here we have denoted the vir-
tual state of interest as ρph, not ρvir; and that we have
some extra emissions of ρph and ρjunk, which we simply
ignore in the analysis. Using Eq. (6), we have that, ex-







Nneg, p̃pos|ρneg , ε/2
)




where Nt is the number of detected events with a tag
of t, p̃ph|ρph = pph/(pph + ppos/cpos) and p̃pos|ρneg = 1 −
pneg/(pneg + pposcneg/cpos).
In the analysis above, we have assumed that Alice and
Bob reveal their choice of basis for all rounds, and then
probabilistically assign all events such that (j, s) ∈ Z to
either T or K with probabilities pT |Z and pK|Z . How-
ever, note the following: (1) the probability to assign a
particular emission to T or K must be independent of
whether or not it is detected, since Eve has no infor-
mation about this assignment when she makes her an-
nouncements; and (2) the set assigned to the undetected
rounds is irrelevant, since their data is not used at any
point in the analysis. This implies that it is only neces-
sary for Alice and Bob to reveal their choice of basis in
the detected rounds, and then assign each detected event
such that (j, s) ∈ Z to either Td or Kd with probabilities
pT |Z and pK|Z , respectively, where Td (Kd) is the set of
detected test (key) rounds. By a similar argument, we
conclude that Alice and Bob only need to reveal their
choice of (j, s) for the emissions in Td, and then assign
each of them a tag of t ∈ {pos, neg} with probability
pt|j,s,T . For a full description of the protocol, including
these assignments, see Appendix D.
Case in which Charlie reports several projections
The analysis above can be easily generalised to the case
in which Charlie may report a projection to two or more
Bell states. Essentially, the procedure is simply repeated
separately for each successful projection announcement
Ω. Note that, because the definition of a phase error
depends on Ω, so does the operator associated with a
phase error, which we now denote as ρphΩ . By repeating
the procedure in Eqs. (23) to (27), we define the operators
ρposΩ and ρnegΩ , and the coefficients cposΩ and cnegΩ , for
each Ω. Then, we imagine that, for all Ω, Alice and Bob
assign a tag tΩ ∈ {posΩ, negΩ} to each emission in T
with probability ptΩ|j,s,T , defined similarly to Eq. (29),
in such a way that the average state with a tag of tΩ is
ρtΩ . In the virtual protocol, we also imagine that Alice
and Bob assign a tag tΩ = phΩ to each emission of ρphΩ .
Then, if Alice and Bob look only at the assigned tag
of tΩ, the scenario becomes equivalent to the “Tagged
Virtual Protocol Ω”, in which Alice and Bob emit ρtΩ
with probability ptΩ . Let NtΩ be the number of events
with a tag of tΩ in which Charlie announced Ω. Applying
the results of Section I to the “Tagged Virtual Protocol












and because of the equivalence between the “Tagged Vir-
tual Protocol Ω” and the virtual protocol, Eq. (31) must
also hold for the latter, for all Ω. Thus, the total number





except with probability ε =
∑
Ω εΩ. By a similar ar-
gument as in the main analysis above, we deduce that,
in the actual protocol: (1) Alice and Bob only need to
reveal their choice of basis in the detected rounds, and
then assign each detected event such that (j, s) ∈ Z to
either Td or Kd with probabilities pT |Z and pK|Z , respec-
tively, where Td (Kd) is the set of detected test (key)
rounds; and (2) Alice and Bob only need to reveal their
choice of (j, s) for the emissions in Td, and then assign
each of them a tag of tΩ ∈ {posΩ, negΩ} with probabil-
ity ptΩ|j,s,T , where Ω is Charlie’s announcement on that
round.
IV. SECRET-KEY RATE AND SECURITY
PARAMETER
In Sections II and III, we have shown how to obtain







After calculating this bound, Alice and Bob perform error
correction, error verification, and privacy amplification.
They obtain a secret key of length







whereNs is the length of the sifted key, λEC is the number
of bits revealed in the error correction step, and ǫc is
the probability that Alice and Bob’s keys will not be
identical after the error verification step. It is known
[5, 15] that, if the number of phase errors is bounded as
in Eq. (33) and the secret-key length is set as in Eq. (34),





the protocol is also ǫc-correct, then it is ǫsec-secure, with
ǫsec = ǫc + ǫs.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we simulate the secret key obtainable
for both the P&M and MDI LT protocols, using the anal-
ysis introduced in the previous sections. As usual, we
assume the nominal scenario in which no eavesdropper is
present. Moreover, we assume that the users’ sources
emit three different imperfectly-encoded single-photon
states in the form
|ψj〉 = cos(θj) |0Z〉 + sin(θj) |1Z〉 , (35)
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where {|0Z〉 , |1Z〉} forms a qubit basis, and θj ∈ [0, 2π) is
the encoded phase. For the P&M scheme, we assume that
Alice’s states satisfy θ0Z = 0, θ1Z = κπ/2, and θ0X =
κπ/4, where κ = 1 + δ/π and δ quantifies the magnitude
of the SPFs. For the MDI setup, we assume that Alice’s
and Bob’s states satisfy θ0 = θ
′
0 = 0, θ1 = θ
′
1 = κπ/2,
θτ = κπ/4 and θ
′
τ = −κπ/4, where θj (θ′s) denotes the
angle of Alice’s (Bob’s) state when she (he) emits state
j (s).
To simulate the data that would be obtained in an ex-
periment, we use the channel model in Ref. [17] for the
P&M protocol, and the channel model in Appendix E
for the MDI protocol. For simplicity, in the latter we
assume that Charlie only announces a detection if he ob-
tains a projection to the Bell state Ψ−. The experimental
parameters considered are: SPF’s parameter δ = 0.126,
error correction inefficiency f = 1.16, dark count proba-
bility of the detectors pd = 10
−8 and fiber loss coefficient
α = 0.2 dB/km. Moreover, we select the correctness and
secrecy parameters to be ǫc = 10
−8 and ǫs = 10−8, re-
spectively, and for simplicity we set ξ = ε in Eq. (34),
which means that ε = ǫ2s/4. In our simulations, we op-
timise over Alice and Bob’s basis selection probabilities,
and in the MDI protocol, we also optimise over the value
of pT |Z . Also, we consider different values of the block
size Ntot, which represents the total number of rounds
in the protocol. Finally, we assume an error-correction
leakage of λEC = fh(eZ) bits, where eZ is the bit-error
rate of the sifted key. The results for the P&M and the
MDI LT protocols are shown in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b),
respectively.
For completeness, we compare our results with those
of an alternative analysis based on the application of
Azuma’s inequality. This alternative analysis, presented
in Appendix F, is essentially a simplified version of the
security proof in Ref. [13], which considers the emission
of weak coherent pulses rather than single photons. The
results in Fig. 4 show that our analysis based on random
sampling offers significantly higher performances for both
the P&M and MDI LT protocols. The difference in per-
formance is larger for lower values of Ntot, while as Ntot
increases, the two analyses slowly converge. In the case
Ntot → ∞, both analyses provide a perfect estimation of
the phase-error rate, and thus offer the same secret-key
rate.
We note that a novel concentration inequality for sums
of dependent random variables has been recently up-
loaded to a preprint server by Kato [24]. This result can
be regarded as an improved version of Azuma’s inequal-
ity that is much tighter when the success probability of
the random variables is low. In Appendix F, we give a
statement of the result, and use it to substitute Azuma’s
inequality in the alternative finite-key analysis of the LT
protocol. However, it must be said that, when applied
to QKD protocols, Kato’s inequality requires an extra
condition that is not needed in either our analysis based
on random sampling or analyses based on Azuma’s in-
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Figure 4. Secret-key rate obtainable using our analysis based
on random sampling theory (solid lines), for the P&M (a)
and MDI (b) LT protocols, as a function of the overall chan-
nel loss and for different values of the block size Ntot. For
comparison, we include the secret-key rate obtainable using
an alternative analysis based on Azuma’s inequality (dashed
lines), similar to that of Ref. [13]. For both LT protocols, our
analysis clearly outperforms the alternative analysis based on
Azuma’s inequality.
equality. Namely, it requires users to attempt to predict
the results that they expect to obtain in the experiment,
before they actually run the experiment. This is an im-
portant step, since the inequality is only tight when the
actual experimental data was reasonable close to their
predictions [25].
In Fig. 5, we compare the performance of our analysis
based on random sampling theory with that of our alter-
native analysis based on Kato’s inequality. For simplic-
ity, in the alternative analysis, we assume that the users
could perfectly predict the experimental data that they
obtain in the experiment, which maximises the secret-key
rate obtainable. Fig. 5(a) shows that, in the case of the
P&M protocol, the difference between the two analyses
vanishes almost completely. Conversely, Fig. 5(b) shows
that, in the case of the MDI protocol, our analysis based
on random sampling still retains an advantage, although
10
significantly smaller than that observed in Fig. 4(b). We
emphasise that, unlike the alternative analysis based on
Kato’s inequality, our analysis based on random sampling
does not require the users to make any prediction before
running the experiment.
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Figure 5. Comparison between the secret-key rate obtain-
able using our random sampling analysis (solid lines) and our
alternative analysis based on the application of a novel con-
centration inequality for dependent random variables (dashed
lines), for both the P&M (a) and MDI (b) versions of the LT
protocol and different values of the block size Ntot. For the
P&M protocol, the performance of the two security proofs
is almost identical, while for the MDI protocol, our analysis
based on random sampling provides slightly better secret-key
rates.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this work, we have proved the finite-key secu-
rity of the loss-tolerant (LT) QKD protocol against
general attacks, for both its prepare-and-measure and
measurement-device-independent versions. Our security
analysis reduces the parameter estimation task to a clas-
sical random sampling problem, which can be solved us-
ing Chernoff bounds, and provides higher secret-key rates
than previous results based on the application of Azuma’s
inequality [13].
Although we have assumed single-photon sources, we
believe that our analysis can be extended to the case in
which the users employ weak coherent sources, as long
as the single-photon components of the three encoded
pulses satisfy the requirements of our proof, i.e. they are
characterised and belong to the same qubit space. In
that case, the users should assign tags to their emissions





pos − cnegρ(1)neg, where ρ(1)t is
the average quantum state of a single-photon pulse with







neg; ε), where N
(1)
t denotes the
number of detected single-photon pulses with a tag of t.




neg are not directly observable,
since the users do not know the photon number of their
emissions. However, by using different laser intensities µ,
they are able to observe the values {Nµpos} and {Nµneg} for
all µ, where Nµt is the number of detected emissions with
a tag of t that originated from intensity µ. Thus, they
can apply the decoy-state method [26–29] to obtain an




neg), using for example
the numerical techniques introduced in Ref. [30].
Also, in our random sampling analysis, we have as-
sumed that the three encoded states live in the same
qubit space. In a future work, it would be interesting
to consider if our security proof can be extended to the
case in which the qubit assumption is not satisfied, due
to additional imperfections such as mode dependencies
[17] or correlations between different rounds of the pro-
tocol [18, 19]. In that case, one can no longer derive
an operator equality between the virtual and the actual
states, such as e.g. Eq. (11). Instead, one needs to find an
operator dominance condition [15] between them, which
is non-trivial if the side-channel states are not charac-
terised, as assumed by Refs. [17–19].
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Appendix A: Random sampling analysis
Here, we prove the statements in Eqs. (3) and (4),
and give an expression for the functions gL and gU . Let
us assume that we have a population of n items, where
n is unknown. Each item is assigned to either K1 with
probability p or to K2 with probability 1−p. We know the
value of K2 = |K2| and we would like to obtain bounds
on K1 = |K1|.
Let ξi = 1 if the i-th trial is assigned to K2 and ξi = 0




ξi = K2. (A1)
Clearly, E[K2] = (1 − p)n, and therefore n = E[K2]/(1 −
p). Using the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound [25,














where W0 and W−1 are branches of the Lambert W func-
tion, and each of the bounds fails with probability at most
ε. From this and the fact that n = K1 + K2, we have
that
K1 = n−K2 =
E[K2]















=: gL(K2, p, ε),
K1 = n−K2 =
E[K2]







1 − p −K2 =: gU (K2, p, ε),
(A3)
where each of the bounds fails with probability ε. It can
be shown that gU is an increasing function of K2. Note
that Eq. (A3) is only valid for K2 > 0. In the special
case K2 = 0, we have that [31]
gL(0, p, ε) := 0
gU (0, p, ε) := −
ln ε
1 − p .
(A4)
We note that this random sampling problem can also be
solved using the method introduced in Ref. [15].
Appendix B: Operator-form linear relationship
between the virtual and actual states
In this Appendix, we show how to find an operator-
form linear relationship between the virtual states and
the actual states, see Eq. (11) and Eq. (24). For simplic-
ity, we provide first the procedure for the P&M protocol;
then, at the end of this Appendix, we show how to ex-
tend it to the MDI case. The only assumption on Alice’s
emitted states, |ψj〉a for j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, is that they
are linearly dependent, i.e. all three states live in the
same qubit space. However, the analysis simplifies sig-
nificantly if they are all in the same standard basis plane
of the Bloch sphere, such as the XZ, XY or ZY plane.
First, we consider this simpler case, and then provide the
analysis for the general case.
1. Case in which all states are in a standard basis
plane
Without loss of generality, we assume that the three
states are in the XZ plane of the Bloch sphere, i.e. they
can be expressed as
|ψj〉a = cos(θj) |0Z〉a + sin(θj) |1Z〉a , (B1)
where θj = (−π, π]. Alice generates her sifted key from
the detected emissions of |ψ0Z 〉a and |ψ1Z 〉a. To prove the
security of the sifted key, we consider an entanglement-




(|0Z〉A |ψ0Z 〉a + |1Z〉A |ψ1Z 〉a) . (B2)
In this virtual protocol, Alice measures her local ancilla
A in the complementary basis {|0X〉A , |1X〉A}, where
|αX〉A = 1/
√
2 [|0Z〉A + (−1)α |1Z〉A] for α ∈ {0, 1}. If







|ψ0Z 〉a + (−1)α |ψ1Z 〉a
)
, (B3)
where pvirα|Z = ‖|ψ0Z 〉a + (−1)α |ψ1Z 〉a‖
2
/4 = (1 +
(−1)α cos(θ0Z − θ1Z ))/2 is the probability that Alice ob-
tains |αX〉A. Since |ψ0Z 〉a and |ψ1Z 〉a are in the XZ
plane, |ψvirα〉a is also in the XZ plane.
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j ] be the Bloch vector of the state
|ψj〉a. We have that SZj = cos(2θj), SXj = sin(2θj) and
SYj = 0. Thus, in operator form, the state |ψj〉a can be
expressed as











where σI is the identity operator and σK , for K ∈
{Z,X, Y }, is a Pauli operator. It is useful to see Eq. (B4)
as a system of linear equations, with three unknowns (σI ,
σZ , σX) and three equations (one for each |ψj〉a). We can
write this system in matrix form:
ρ = Sσ, (B5)
where ρ = [ρ0Z , ρ1Z , ρ0X ]
T



















and express its solution as
σ = S−1ρ. (B7)
Equation (B7) essentially says that the operators
σI , σZ , σX can be expressed as a linear combination of
the actual states ρj . This implies that every state that
can be expressed as a linear combination of σI , σZ , σX
(i.e., every state in the XZ plane) can also be expressed
as a linear combination of ρj . In particular, the virtual
states |ψvirα〉a are in the XZ plane, and in operator form
they can be expressed as












where SZvir0 = −SZvir1 = cos(θ0Z + θ1Z ) and SXvir0 =
−SXvir1 = sin(θ0Z + θ1Z ). Or equivalently,









. Combining Eqs. (B7)
and (B9), we have that
ρvirα = SvirαS
−1ρ = fαρ, (B10)
where fα := SvirαS
−1 is a row vector. If we express fα
as fα = [c0Z |α, c1Z |α, c0X |α], we obtain Eq. (11), i.e.
ρvirα = c0Z |virαρ0Z + c1Z |virαρ1Z + c0X |virαρ0Z , (B11)
for α ∈ {0, 1}, as required.
In our numerical simulations, we assume that the three
states emitted by Alice are in the XZ plane, and that
when written as in Eq. (B1), their phases satisfy θ0Z = 0,
θ1Z = κπ/2 and κπ/4, for some κ. For this particular
case, an analytical expression for the coefficients is given
by
c0Z |vir0 = c1Z |vir0 = 0,
c0X |vir0 = 1,
c0Z |vir1 = c1Z |vir1 = csc
2(κπ/4)/2,
c0X |vir1 = − cot2(κπ/4)).
2. General case
Here, we consider the case in which the three states
are not all in the same standard basis plane. Formally,
we assume that for all K ∈ {Z,X, Y }, there is at least
one j such that SKj 6= 0. Therefore Eq. (B4) becomes













and now we have a system of three equations with four
unknowns. We have to find a way to modify Eq. (B12)
such that it becomes a system with three unknowns.
For any basis {|0U 〉a , |1U 〉a} of the qubit space, Alice’s
emitted states can be expressed as
|ψj〉a = eiγj
(√
uj |0U 〉a + eiφj
√
1 − uj |1U 〉a
)
. (B13)
where 0 ≤ uj ≤ 1, γj ∈ [0, 2π), φj ∈ [0, 2π). Since the
end points of the three Bloch vectors associated to Alice’s
emitted states form a plane, there must be a basis U such
that uj has the same value ∀j. Expressed in this basis,




ỹ |0Ỹ 〉a + e
iφj
√
1 − ỹ |1Ỹ 〉a
)
, (B14)
for some 0 ≤ ỹ ≤ 1. Let V be a unitary operator such
that V |0Y 〉a = |0Ỹ 〉a and V |1Y 〉a = |1Ỹ 〉a. V can be
regarded as a transformation from the set of mutually
unbiased bases Z, X, Y to the set of mutually unbiased
bases Z̃, X̃, Ỹ . Let us define the modified Pauli operators
σ̃K = V σKV
†, for K ∈ {Z,X, Y }, and express the actual







Z σ̃Z + S̃
j





Note that the three states have the same Ỹ component,
i.e. S̃jY = S̃Y := 2ỹ − 1, ∀j. This allows us to define the












which has a similar form as Eq. (B4), i.e. it can be re-
garded as a linear system of three equations and three
unknowns. If we define ρ = [ρ0Z , ρ1Z , ρ0X ]
T
, σ =




















we have that ρ = Sσ, and therefore,
σ = S−1ρ. (B18)
The previous equation implies that the modified Pauli
operators σ̃O, σ̃Z , σ̃X can be expressed as a linear com-
bination of the actual states ρj . Therefore, any state that
can be expressed as a linear combination of σ̃O, σ̃Z , σ̃X
(i.e. any state whose Ỹ -component is S̃Y ) can also be
expressed as a linear combination of the ρj .
If we define the virtual states as in Eq. (B3), it is likely
that they will not satisfy the condition that their Ỹ -
component is S̃Y . However, note that to obtain Eq. (B3),
we have assumed that Alice measures the ancilla A of the
entangled state in Eq. (B2) in the X basis. In reality, Al-
ice could have decided to measure it in any other basis
that is mutually unbiased with Z. Equivalently, we can
express this degree of freedom by assuming that Alice






|0Z〉A |ψ0〉a + eiφ |1Z〉A |ψ1〉a
)
, (B19)
















/4 is the prob-
ability that Alice obtains |αX〉A. Substituting Eq. (B14)
in Eq. (B20), one can easily show that if Alice chooses
φ = γ0Z − γ1Z + (φ0Z − φ1Z ) /2, then the modified Bloch
vector of the virtual state |ψvirα〉a, [S̃Zvirα , S̃Xvirα , S̃
virα
Y ],























Eqs. (B18) and (B22), we have that
ρvirα = SvirαS
−1ρ := fαρ, (B23)
where fα := SvirαS
−1 is a row vector. If we express fα
as fα = [c0Z |α, c1Z |α, c0X |α], we obtain Eq. (11), i.e.
|ψvirα〉〈ψvirα |a = c0Z |α |ψ0Z 〉〈ψ0Z |a + c1Z |α |ψ1Z 〉〈ψ1Z |a
+ c0X |α |ψ0X 〉〈ψ0X |a ,
(B24)
for α ∈ {0, 1}, as required.
3. MDI protocol
In the MDI scenario, we essentially perform the above
procedure separately for Alice’s and Bob’s states. Let
|ψj〉a (|ψ′s〉b), with j (s) ∈ {0, 1, τ}, denote Alice’s (Bob’s)
states, and let ρj ≡ |ψj〉〈ψj | (ρ′s ≡ |ψ′s〉〈ψ′s|) denote their
operator form. Using the analysis in the previous sec-
tions, we have that















where α, β ∈ {0, 1}, and ρvirα (ρ′virβ ) denotes one of
Alice’s (Bob’s) virtual states, emitted with probability
pvirα|K (p
′
virβ |K). We can define Alice and Bob’s joint
virtual states as









s|virβ . Depending on Charlie’s Bell
state report, the definition of a phase error will change.
If Charlie reports a projection to either Ψ− or Φ−, the
phase-error operator is defined as
ρph = (pvir0,0ρvir0,0 + pvir1,1ρvir1,1)/pph, (B27)
where pph = pvir0,0 + pvir1,1 . Conversely, if he reports a
projection to either Ψ+ or Φ+, the phase-error operator
is defined as
ρph = (pvir0,1ρvir0,1 + pvir1,0ρvir1,0)/pph, (B28)
where pph = pvir0,1 + pvir1,0 . In any case, one can express





where the coefficients cj,s are a linear function of the
coefficients cj,s|α,β , and can be obtained by substituting
Eq. (B26) in either Eq. (B27) or Eq. (B28).
In our numerical simulations we assume that Alice and
Bob’s states are in the XZ plane, and that when written
as in Eq. (B1), their phases satisfy θ0 = θ
′
0 = 0, θ1 =
θ′1 = κπ/2, θτ = −θ′τ = κπ/4. For this particular case,
we have that Alice’s virtual states satisfy
c0|vir0 = c1|vir0 = 0,
c0|vir0 = 1,
c0|vir1 = c1|vir1 = csc
2(κπ/4)/2,
cτ |vir1 = − cot2(κπ/4);
(B30)
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1 + 2 cos(κπ/2)
.
(B31)
Appendix C: Description of the P&M protocol
(1) Preparation
For each round, Alice chooses a pure state |ψj〉a
with probability pj , where j ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, and
sends it to Bob through the quantum channel.
Emissions of |ψ0X 〉a (|ψ0Z 〉a and |ψ1Z 〉a) are con-
sidered to belong to the X (Z) basis.
(2) Detection
Bob measures the incoming signals in either the Z
or the X basis, which he chooses with probabilities
pZ and pX = 1 − pZ , respectively.
(3) Sifting
Bob announces which rounds were detected, and
Alice and Bob reveal their basis choices in those
rounds. Let KZ be the set of detected rounds in
which both users employed the Z basis, and let TX
be the set of detected rounds in which Bob em-
ployed the X basis. Then,
(3.1) Alice (Bob) defines her (his) sifted key as the
bit values associated with her emissions (his
measurement results) in the rounds in KZ .
(3.2) For all rounds in TX , Bob announces his mea-
surement result.
(4) Tag assignment
Alice probabilistically assigns a tag to all rounds in
TX , depending on her choice of state and Bob’s
measurement result. Namely, if she chose the
state |ψj〉a and Bob obtained measurement result
(α ⊕ 1)X , for α ∈ {0, 1}, she assigns a tag of
tα ∈ {posα, negα} with probability ptα|j,XB , given
by Eq. (17). Then, she calculates N
(α⊕1)X
tα , the
number of detected events with a tag of tα in which
Bob obtained measurement result (α⊕ 1)X .
(5) Parameter estimation
Alice uses the values of {N (α⊕1)Xtα } to obtain an up-
per bound NUph on Nph, the number of phase errors
in her sifted key, using Eq. (21).
(6) Postprocessing
(6.1) Error correction: Alice sends Bob a pre-
fixed amount λEC of syndrome information
bits through an authenticated public channel,
which Bob uses to correct errors in his sifted
key.
(6.2) Error verification: Alice and Bob compute
a hash of their error-corrected keys using a
random universal hash function, and check
whether they are equal. If so, they continue to
the next step; otherwise, they abort the pro-
tocol.
(6.3) Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob extract
a secret key pair (SA, SB) of length |SA| =
|SB | = ℓ from their error-corrected keys using
a random two-universal hash function.
Appendix D: Description of the MDI protocol
(1) Quantum communication
For each round, Alice (Bob) selects the state |ψj〉a
(|ψ′s〉b) with probability pj (p′s), where j (s) ∈
{0, 1, τ}, and sends it to an untrusted middle node
Charlie, who announces whether or not he obtained
a successful projection to a Bell state. Emissions
for which j ∈ {0, 1} (s ∈ {0, 1}) are considered to
belong to the Z basis.
(2) Sifting
Alice and Bob announce their basis choices in the
detected rounds. Then, they assign all detected
rounds in which at least one of them used the X
basis to set Td. Also, for each detected round in
which both chose the Z basis, they assign it to set
Kd with probability pK|Z , or to set Td with proba-
bility pT |Z = 1− pK|Z . Then, they announce these
assignments, and
(2.1) Alice (Bob) defines her (his) sifted key as her
(his) choices of j (s) in the rounds in Kd.
(2.2) For all rounds in Td, Alice and Bob announce
their choice of j and s.
(3) Tag assignment
Alice and Bob assign a tag t ∈ {pos, neg} to
each round in Td with probability pt|j,s,T , give by
Eq. (29). Then, they calculate Nt, the number of
detected events with a tag of t.
(4) Parameter estimation
Alice and Bob substitute the values of Npos and
Nneg in Eq. (30) to obtain an upper bound N
U
ph on
Nph, the number of errors in the sifted key.
(5) Postprocessing
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(5.1) Error correction: Alice sends Bob a pre-
fixed amount λEC of syndrome information
bits through an authenticated public channel,
which Bob uses to correct errors in his sifted
key.
(5.2) Error verification: Alice and Bob compute
a hash of their error-corrected keys using a
random universal hash function, and check
whether they are equal. If so, they continue to
the next step; otherwise, they abort the pro-
tocol.
(5.3) Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob extract
a secret key pair (SA, SB) of length |SA| =
|SB | = ℓ from their error-corrected keys using
a random two-universal hash function.
Appendix E: Channel model for the MDI protocol
In this Appendix, we present the channel model used
in our simulations of the MDI LT protocol, which is
based on the single-photon version of the original MDI
QKD scheme [20]. Specifically, we assume that Alice and
Bob prepare polarised single-photon states in the form
of Eq. (35), where here |0Z〉 and |1Z〉 denote the hor-
izontally and vertically polarised single-photon states,
respectively. After the preparation, Alice (Bob) sends
the transmitted states to the intermediate party Char-
lie through a lossy quantum channel of transmittance ηA
(ηB), who interferes the two incoming signals in a 50:50
beamsplitter, which has on each output port a polaris-
ing beamsplitter (PBS) that separates the horizontal and
vertical modes. Now, let h1 and v1 (h2 and v2) be the
threshold detectors placed at horizontal and vertical out-
put port of the first (second) PBS, respectively, and let
pd be the dark-count probability of each detector. After
the measurement, Charlie announces the Bell state Ψ+
(Ψ−) if he observes clicks in h1 and v1, or h2 and v2 (h1
and v2, or h1 and v2). Then, it is easy to prove that the
conditional probability that Charles announces the Bell
state Ψ± given that Alice and Bob selected the states
|ψj〉a and |ψs〉b, respectively, is
PΨ
±








(1 + cos(2κθj) cos(2κθ
′
s))
+ pd(1 − ηA)ηB + pdηA(1 − ηB)




Appendix F: Alternative analysis using
concentration inequalities for dependent random
variables
In this Appendix, we present an alternative analysis
that requires the application of a concentration inequal-
ity for sums of dependent Bernoulli random variables.
This alternative analysis is a simplified version of that of
Ref. [13], which considers the emission of weak coherent
pulses rather than single photons. In Ref. [13], Azuma’s
inequality [10] is the concentration inequality applied.
Here, we also present a new security proof based on the
application of the recently proposed Kato’s inequality
[24]. First, we introduce the concentration inequalities
that we consider, and then we provide the analysis.
1. Concentration inequalities
Let ξ1, ..., ξN be a sequence of Bernoulli random vari-
ables, and let Λl =
∑l
u=1 ξu. Let Fl be its natural filtra-
tion, i.e. the σ-algebra generated by {ξ1, ..., ξl}.
a. Azuma’s inequality













































Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1) + ∆A,
(F2)
except with probability at most εA for each of the bounds,
where ∆A =
√
2N ln ε−1A .
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b. Kato’s inequality
According to Kato’s inequality [24], for any n, and any

















































































which holds when a ≤
√
N/2.
In the following, we will use Eq. (F3) to obtain an up-
per bound on
∑N
u=1 Pr(ξu = 1|Fu−1), Eq. (F4) to obtain
a lower bound on
∑N
u=1 Pr(ξu = 1|Fu−1), and Eq. (F5)
to obtain an upper bound on ΛN .
Upper bound on the sum of probabilities
Before running the protocol, one should use previous
knowledge of the channel to come up with a prediction
Λ̃N of the value of ΛN that one expects to obtain. Then,
one calculates the values of a and b that would minimise
the deviation term in Eq. (F3) if the realisation of ΛN
equalled Λ̃N , for a fixed failure probability εK. These are






























nΛ̃N (n− Λ̃N ) ln εK − 16N3/2 ln2 εK + 9
√
2(N − 2Λ̃N )
√
−N2 ln εK(9Λ̃N (n− Λ̃N ) − 2N ln εK)
)














Pr (ξu = 1|ξ1, ..., ξu−1) ≤ ΛN + ∆UK , (F8)










Lower bound on the sum of probabilities
Similarly to the previous case, one should use previous
knowledge of the channel to come up with a prediction
Λ̃N of the value of ΛN that one expects to obtain after
running the protocol. Then, one calculates the values of a
and b that would minimise the deviation term in Eq. (F4)
if the realisation of ΛN equalled Λ̃N , for a fixed failure
































N Λ̃N (n− Λ̃N ) ln εK + 16N3/2 ln2 εK + 9
√
2(N − 2Λ̃N )
√
−N2 ln εK(9Λ̃N (n− Λ̃N ) − 2N ln εK)
)














Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1) ≥ ΛN − ∆LK , (F12)










Upper bound on the actual value
In this case, we assume that we have an upper bound
SN on the sum of probabilities
∑N
u=1 Pr (ξu = 1|Fu−1),
and we want to obtain an upper bound on ΛN . Before
running the protocol one should use previous knowledge
to come up with a prediction S̃N of the value of the up-
per bound SN that one expects to obtain. Then, one
calculates the values of a and b that would minimise the
deviation term in Eq. (F5) if the prediction comes true.






























3N2 − 8NS̃N + 8S̃2N
)
+ 9(N − 2S̃N )
√






N2 − 2NS̃N + 2S̃2N
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SN + b− a
)
, (F16)
except with probability εK.
2. Analysis
We assume a virtual protocol in which Alice prepares
Ntot copies of the entangled state in Eq. (10), and sends
all subsystems B to Bob through the untrusted quantum
channel. Then, Bob performs a quantum non-demolition
measurement on each system B, learning which rounds
produce a click on his detectors, and saving the sys-
tem B of these detected rounds in a quantum mem-
ory. Let N be the number of detected rounds. For
each detected round u = {1, 2, . . . , N}, Alice measures
her ancilla S, and Bob measures B in the X basis; ex-
cept if Alice obtained S = 5, in which case Bob mea-
sures B in the Z basis. Let ξu = (i, j) represent the
event “Alice learns that she emitted i and Bob obtains
measurement result j”. More specifically, Alice learns
that she emitted i = {vir0, vir1, 0Z , 1Z , 0X} if she ob-
tained S = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} in her measurement of system
S, respectively. Events in which she obtained S = 5 are
ignored in the analysis. Then, using the fact that the
virtual states can be written as an operator-form linear














Pr[ξu = (i, α⊕ 1)|Fu−1],
(F17)
where Fu−1 is the σ-algebra generated by {ξ1, ..., ξu−1}.
Now one needs to apply a concentration bound for sums
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of dependent random variables to substitute the sums of
probabilities in Eq. (F17) by the actual values.
a. Using Azuma’s inequality











except with probability 4εA, where εA is the failure prob-
ability of each aplication of Azuma’s inequality, which
has been applied four times; and δi = ∆A (δi = −∆A) if
ci|virα is positive (negative). Then, the number of phase






except with probability ε = 8εA.







(Nj,s,T + δj,s) + ∆A (F20)
except with probability ε = 9εA, where Nj,s,T is the
number of detected test rounds in which the user emitted
|ψj,s〉a,b, and δj,s = ∆A (δj,s = −∆A) if cj,s is positive
(negative).
b. Using Kato’s inequality











(Nα⊕1i + δi) := Svirα ,
(F21)
except with probability 3εK, where δi = ∆
U
K (δi = −∆LK)
if ci|virα is positive (negative). Substituting Sn → Svirα
and Λn → Nα⊕1virα in Eq. (F16), we obtain an upper bound
N
α⊕1
virα which fails with probability 4εK. Then, the num-






except with probability ε = 8εK.









(Nj,s,T + δj,s) := Sph
(F23)
except with probability ε = 8εA, where δj,s = ∆
U
K (δj,s =
−∆LK) if cj,s is positive (negative). Then, substituting
Sn → Sph and Λn → Nph in Eq. (F16), we obtain an
upper bound on Nph which fails with probability 9εK.
